"You're a felon, and I'm going to convince others that they have the authority to arrest you - and you WILL be arrested!"

18 USC 875. Interstate communications.
          (a) Whoever transmits in interstate or foreign commerce any communication containing any demand or request for a ransom or reward for the release of any kidnapped person, shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than twenty years, or both.
          (b) Whoever, with intent to extort from any person, firm, association, or corporation, any money or other thing of value, transmits in interstate or foreign commerce any communication containing any threat to kidnap any person or any threat to injure the person of another, shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than twenty years, or both.
          (c) Whoever transmits in interstate or foreign commerce any communication containing any threat to kidnap any person or any threat to injure the person of another, shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than five years, or both.
          (d) Whoever, with intent to extort from any person, firm, association, or corporation, any money or other thing of value, transmits in interstate or foreign commerce any communication containing any threat to injure the property or reputation of the addressee or of another or the reputation of a deceased person or any threat to accuse the addressee or any other person of a crime, shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than two years, or both.

18 USC 879. Threats against former Presidents and certain other persons
          (a) Whoever knowingly and willfully threatens to kill, kidnap, or inflict bodily harm upon-
          (1) a former President or a member of the immediate family of a former President;
          (2) a member of the immediate family of the President, the President-elect, the Vice President, or the Vice President-elect;
          (3) a major candidate for the office of President or Vice President, or a member of the immediate family of such candidate; or
          (4) a person protected by the Secret Service under section 3056(a)(6);
shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than 5 years, or both.

"I will kill you . . . I am now armed[.]"

"Re: Obama fuck the niggar, he will have a 50 cal. in the head pretty soon."

"Shoot the nig, country fucked for another 4 years+ What nig has done ANYTHING right???? long term???? never in history, except sambos."

"Re: And so it begins."

"Pistol? Dude, Josh needs to get us one of these, just shoot the nigga's car and POOF!"

"[I]t does not convey the notion that Bagdasarian himself had plans to fulfill the prediction[.]"

"Neither does the . . . statement reflect the defendant's intent to threaten that he himself would kill or injure Obama."

"The statement makes no reference to Bagdasarian himself and so [it] cannot reasonably be taken to express his intent to shoot Obama."

". . . fail to express an intent on his part to take any action. . ."

". . . is not sufficient to establish that he intended to threaten Obama himself."

"As we have explained, supra at 9808-13, that neither of Bagdasarian's statements on its face constitutes a true threat unprotected by the First Amendment. Most significantly, one is predictive and the other, exhortatory. For the same reasons, the evidence is not sufficient for any reasonable finder of fact to have concluded beyond a reasonable doubt that Bagdasarian intended his statements to be taken as threats. See Jackson, 443 US at 319."

"But, as we have explained, incitement [of others] to injure or kill a presidential candidate does not qualify as an offense under 18 USC § 879(a)(3)."

"[P]utting certain individuals in harm's way by singling them out for the attentions of violent but unrelated third parties is [conduct] protected by the First Amendment."

"The rule seems to be similar when as arrest is a so-called citizen's arrest, made by one not a law enforcement officer, it requires reasonable cause to believe the arrested party guilty of a felony before the arrest will support a search and seizure of evidence of crime. Information, belief, or suspicion as to commission of a felony, as jurisdiction for arrest by a private person without a warrant; 133 A.L.R. 608 (1941)."

"In Arizona, statutes that are in derogation of the common law are strictly construed. See Foundation Dev. Corp. v. Loehmann's, 163 Ariz. 438, 444, 788 P.2d 1189, 1195 (1990). In the case of misdemeanors such as shoplifting, there is no common law privilege of arrest. Gortarez v. Smitty's Super Valu, Inc., 140 Ariz. 97, 102, 680 P.2d 807, 812 (1984). A.R.S. § 13-1805 is in derogation of the common law because it allows private individuals to detain persons suspected of shoplifting. Therefore, A.R.S. § 13-1805 must be strictly construed to only permit detention of "persons suspected" of shoplifting."

UNPUBLISHED: Budnick v. Barnstable County Bar Advocates, Inc., #92-1933 (CA1 1993): "But, "a police officer, while unable to act as an officer in an adjoining jurisdiction, does not cease to be a citizen in that jurisdiction . . . and may lawfully conduct a citizen's arrest there if he has probable cause to believe that a felony has been committed and that the person arrested has committed it." Commonwealth v. Dise, 31 Mass. App.Ct. 701, 704, 583 N.E.2d 271 (1991), further appellate review denied, 412 Mass. 1102, 588 N.E.2d 691 (1992)."

Aldrich v. Town of Milton, Civil #2009-11282-JLT (USDC of Mass. July 9, 2012): "In the Commonwealth, "a private citizen may lawfully arrest someone who has in fact committed a felony." Grise, 398 Mass. at 250, 496 N.E.2d at 164; Harris, 11 Mass.App.Ct. at 170, 415 N.E.2d at 220."

Holm v. Town of Derry, Civil #11-cv-32-JD (USDC New Hampshire on 1st Cir., Dec. 20, 2011): "In support, Sienkiewicz cites RSA 627:5, IV, which states that a "private person acting on his own is justified in using non-deadly force upon another when and to the extent that he reasonably believes it necessary to arrest or prevent the escape from custody of such other whom he reasonably believes to have committed a felony and who in fact has committed that felony."

US v. Gowen, 40 F.2d 593, 596 (1930): "This [NY Code Crmnl. Proc. § 183] in effect is declaratory of the common law, which concededly permits a peace officer or a private individual to arrest without a warrant where a felony has in fact been committed by the person arrested and the person making the arrest had probable cause for so believing. See Carroll v. United States, 267 US 132, 161, 45 S.Ct. 280, 69 L.Ed. 543, 39 A.L.R. 790; Brady v. United States, 300 F. 540 (CA 6); Bishop, New, Crim. Proc. (2d Ed.) § 181." (See also US v. Lindenfield, 142 F.2d 829, 831 (CA2 1944) (citing Gowen, id.)).

US v. Swarovski, 557 F.2d 40, 45 (CA2 1977) (quoting Marsh v. US, 29 F.2d 172 (CA2 1928) judge L. Hand, quoting US v. Rosse, 418 F.2d 38, 39 (CA2 1969) cert. den. 397 US 998, 25 L.Ed.2d 408, 90 S.Ct. 1143 (1970): "Initially, there can be no doubt that defendant was lawfully arrested, even though the agents possessed no warrants. The law is clear that any person, law enforcement officer or private citizen, can make an arrest where a felony has in fact been committed, and the person making the arrest has probable cause for so believing. US v. Gowen, 2nd Cir., 40 F.2d 593, rev. on other grounds in Go-Bart Importing Co. v. US, 282 US 344, 51 S.Ct. 153, 75 L.Ed. 374; Carroll v. US, 267 US 132, 45 S.Ct. 280, 69 L.Ed. 543, 39 A.L.R. 790; Brady v. US, 6th Cir., 300 F. 540, cert. den. 266 US 620, 45 S.Ct. 99, 69 L.Ed. 472; Pritchett v. Sullivan, 8th Cir. 182 F. 480; cf. also 5 USCA § 300a, codifying the common law with regard to arrests by agents of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and A.L.I. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1930, § 21, and commentary, pp. 231-238. And the agents here certainly had more than probable cause for believing that defendant had just committed a felony...142 F.2d 829, at 831-2. (footnote omitted.) (This case concerned an arrest and prosecution for illicit sales of morphine, but took place long before the enactment of 26 USC § 7607 on July 18, 1956.)."

Dorsey v. United States, 174 F.2d 899 (CA5 1949): "As to Dorsey, we have concluded his arrest though without a warrant, and by persons who were not arresting officers, was lawful. There being no federal statute on the subject, the arrest in Florida for a federal offense is governed by Florida law. United States v. DiRe, 332 US 581, 68 S.Ct. 222, 92 L.Ed. 210. The Florida law is the common law, as modified by statute. The common law authorizes a private person also to arrest for a felony committed in his presence; or if a felony has been committed, and he has probable cause to believe and does believe the arrested person to be guilty. He can justify his not getting a warrant, though he had the opportunity, by proving that arrested person was actually guilty. 4 Am.Jur., Arrest, 35, 36, 37; C.J.S., Arrest sec. 8. See also US v. Gowen, 40 F.2d 593 (CA2), and Brady v. US, 300 F. 540, 541 (CA6)."

Brady v. United States, 300 F. 540, 543 (1924): "It is well established that the right of arrest without a warrant by a private person, in the absence of restrictive statutes, goes at least this far: That if a felony has in fact been committed, he may so arrest the one who is comitting it in his presence, or whom he has reasonable ground to suspect of having committed it. . . In the circumstance of this case, as hereinabove set forth, a private person would have been justified in arresting the defendants, without a warrant and in taking from them evidences of their crime, either on the ground that a felony had been committed[.]"

Richardson v. US, 217 F..2d 696, 698 (CA8 1954): "Complaint is made about the March 16th arrest by the narcotics agents. The arrest was made in Missouri, and under Missouri law a private person may make an arrest on showing of actual commission of a felony and reasonable grounds to suspect the accused."

Hester v. Redwood County, Civil #11-1690-ADM-JJK (USDC Minn. Aug. 6, 2012): "Under Minnesota law, a citizen's arrest may be made when (1) a misdemeanor or felony has been committed in the arresting person's presence, (2) the person arrested has committed the felony, even if not in the arresting person's presence, or (3) if a felony has in fact been committed and the arresting person has reasonable cause to believe the person arrested committed it. Minn.Stat. § 629.37."

US v. Kriz, 301 F.Supp. 1329 1331 (USDC Minnesota, Division III (July 25, 1969)): "Absent a federal statute, the validity of the arrest of defendant is to be resolved by state law subject to federal constitutional safeguards. (cites omitted). Minn. State § 629.37(3) authorizes an arrest without a warrant by a private person 'when a felony has in fact been committed, and he has reasonable cause for believing the person arrested to have committed it.' "

Foss v. US, 266 F. 881, 882 (1920): "It is the duty and the right, not only of every peace officer of the United States, but of every citizen, to assist in prosecuting, and in securing the punishment of, a breach of the peace of the United States. It is the right, as well as the duty of every citizen, when called upon by the proper officer to act as part of the posse comitatus in upholding the laws of the country."
          "In Motes v. United States, 178 US 458, 20 S.Ct. 993, 44 L.Ed. 1150, the statute was held applicable to a conspiracy to injure, oppress, threaten, and intimidate one who had informed the collector of internal revenue of the carrying on of the distillery business in violation of the law. Said the court: "It was the right and privilege of Thompson, in return for the protection he enjoyed under the Constitution and laws of the United States, to aid in the execution of the laws of his country by giving information to the proper authorities of violations of those laws. The right and privilege may properly be said to be secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States." "

Ward v. US, 316 F.2d 113, (1963): "The postal inspectors are not 'peace officers,' as that term is defined by §§ 7 and 817 of the California Penal Code. But this is of no consequence, for the same right exists in private citizens to make arrests without a warrant, as in peace officers, provided subsection (3) (or some other subsection) of California Penal Code § 837 is satisfied. Subsection (3) has two requirements: (a) a felony must have been committed by someone; and (b) 'reasonable cause must exist' to believe the person arrested committed the felony."
           "Any fair reading of the evidence hereinbefore set forth convinces us that reasonable cause for the arrest of appellant existed. 'Reasonable cause to arrest' is no esoteric formula. Would the information and knowledge the arresting person had lead a person of ordinary reasonable judgment, intelligence, care and prudence, to believe the person to be arrested had committed the felony? Mackie v. Ambassador Hotel & Inv. Corp., 1932, 123 Cal.App. 215, 11 P.2d 3; People v. Boss, 1930, 210 Ca1. 245, 290 P. 881."
          "The belief may amount only to an honest and strong suspicion that the person arrested is guilty of a felony. Taylor v. Fine, D.C., 1953, 115 F.Supp. 68; United States v. Bell, D.C., 1943, 48 F.Supp. 986."
          "Mere suspicion alone is not enough. Casserly v. Wheeler, 9 Cir. 1922, 282 F. 389; Poldo v. United States, 9 Cir. 1932, 55 F.2d 866; Cook v. Singer Sewing Machine Co., 1934, 138 Cal.App. 418, 32 P.2d 430."
          "'Probable cause is a suspicion founded upon circumstances sufficiently strong to warrant a reasonable man in belief that charge is true.' People v. Brite, 9 Cal.2d 666, 72 P.2d 122. We agree with the trial judge that reasonable cause was established by substantial evidence sufficient to authorize appellant's arrest without a warrant."

Jack v. Rhay, 366 F.2d 191 (CA9 1966): "Under all of the facts it is established to my satisfaction that the arrest was lawful and the search incident to it. This made the evidence admissible. Reasonable cause to believe that felony has been committed and the arrested person committed it are sufficient to legalize the arrest even if made by private citizens. (See Fernandez v. Klinger, 346 F.2d 210, 211-12 (CA9 1965); Elkanich v. US, 327 F.2d 417 (CA9 1964), cert. den. 377 US 917; Ward v. US, 316 F.2d 113 (CA9 1963), cert. den. 375 US 862; Richardson v. US, 217 F.2d 696 (CA8 1964); US v. Coplon, 185 F.2d 629, 634, 28 A.L.R.2d 1041 (CA2 1950), cert. den. 342 US 920; Dorsey v. US, 174 F.2d 899 (CA6 1949), cert. den. 388 US 950 and 340 US 878; State v. McClung, 66 Wash.2d 654, 404 P.2d 460 (1965)."

Elkanich v. US, 327 F.2d 417, 420 (1964): "Speaking of probable cause sufficient to justify an arrest without a warrant, the Supreme Court, in Draper v. US, [358 US 307, 310, 314, 79 S.Ct. 329, 3 L.Ed.2d 327] supra, stated at page 313 of 358 US Reports, at page 333 of 79 S.Ct., 3 L.Ed.2d 327:

"In dealing with probable cause, ***as the very name implies, we deal with probabilities. There are not technical; they are the factual and practical considerations of every day life on which reasonable and prudent men, not legal technicians, act.' Brinegar v. United States, supra, 338 US 175 (69 S.Ct. at page 1310, 93 L.Ed. 1879). Probable cause exists where 'the facts and circumstances within (the arresting officer's) knowledge and of which they had reasonably trustworthy information (are) sufficient in themselves to warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief that' an offense has been or is being committed: Carroll v. US, 267 US 132, 162 (45 S.Ct. 280, 69 L.Ed. 543.' "

Smock v. Peppermill Casinos, Inc., #3:11-cv-00094-RCJ-VPC USDC Nevada (May 14, 2012): "Defendant notes that its employees, like any citizen, have the statutory privilege to arrest another citizen for a public offense committed or attempted in their presence. See Nev.Rev. Stat. § 171.126(1). (Fn.4)."

Fn.4: "If the offense is a felony, a private person may arrest the offender even though the offense was not committed in his presence, so long as he has "reasonable cause." See id. § 171.126(2)-(3). Defendants only allege misdemeanor trespassing here."

          "Still, the guards were only entitled to use reasonable force. See State v. Weddell, 118 Nev. 206, 43 P.3d 987, 988 (Nev. 2002) ("[A] private person, when arresting another person pursuant to NRS § 171.126, may use no more force than is necessary and reasonable to secure the arrest.")."

Huang v. McEwen, Civil #09-0355-PA-JCG (USDC Central Dist. of Cal. April 26, 2012): "In California, the defense of citizen's arrest mandates in pertinent part that a private person may arrest another for a public offense committed or attempted in his presence. See Cal. Penal Code § 837. "An arrest is taking a person into custody, in a case and in the manner authorized by law. An arrest may be made by a peace officer or by a private person." Id. § 834."

Stroh v. US, Civil #11-cv-00344-LTB-BNB (USDC Colorado, Sept. 17, 2012): "However, I do find a private analogue is available, under Colorado law, to a private individual making a citizen's arrest.' Colorado Revised Statutes § 16-3-201 allows a person who is not a peace officer to arrest another person when any crime has been or is being committed by the arrested person in the presence of the person making the arrest. See also Colo.Rev.Stat. § 18-1-707(7) (providing that "[a] private person acting on his own account is justified in using reasonable and appropriate physical force upon another person when and to the extent that he reasonably believes it necessary to effect the arrest, or to prevent the escape from custody of an arrested person who has committed an offense in his presence")."

US v. Lima, 424 A.2d 113, 120 (1980): "Congress' intent by enacting this statute was to define and restrict the private citizen's common law right to arrest. [S]ection 23-528(b) limits the scope of citizen's arrest power to both felonies and specific misdemeanors, committed in the presence of the private person as distinguished from those not committed in his presence." (cites to Congressional Hearings omitted). By so limiting the citizen's power of arrest, Congress recognized that "law enforcement should generally be carried out by professionals." H.R. REP. No.907, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 118 (1969-70); 1970 D.C. Legislative and Administrative Service 511. See also US v. Dorsey, 146 US. App.D.C. 28, 30 n.4, 449 F.2d 1104, 1106 n.4 (1971). A citizen's arrest power presumes that a law-abiding citizen for his own personal purposes may desire to stop criminal activity just as a merchant has a personal interest in deterring theft of his goods. Consequently, Congress has recognized these legitimate private interests of apprehending persons committing certain crimes within their presence."

"[W]e have referred to the Court of Appeals when enquiring whether a right was "clearly established." "