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Citizen's Arrest v. "True Threats"
If you object in any way to any public servant's theft of your property, assault of your children, or criminal trespass upon your land or burglarizing of your home, you are always accused of having "threatened" a public servant. This will result in criminal charges against you and your children, your spouse, and anyone who lives within ten city blocks of where the protest was verbalized. What do the courts say about this? Is such a protest a "threat to commit an act of unlawful violence against" another individual?
This is an examination of certain common law rights that may find substantial disfavor with law enforcement authorities, despite the obvious innocence of the person who seeks to exercise such rights. It's no secret that public servants view the public at large as a threat to national security, and it's firmly established that government abuses its authority whenever it (public servants) deals with the average individual.
"You're a felon, and I'm going to convince others that they have the authority to arrest you - and you WILL be arrested!"
Is that a threat? Is it a violation of the law? Can this statement be used as valid grounds to prosecute the one who makes that particular statement to a public servant or other individual? Two examples of federal statutes that prohibit "threats" are 18 USC § 879 which relates to presidential candidates, and 18 USC § 875 which deals generally with threats made to another individual.
18 USC 875. Interstate communications.
(a) Whoever transmits in interstate or foreign commerce any communication containing any demand or request for a ransom or reward for the release of any kidnapped person, shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than twenty years, or both.
(b) Whoever, with intent to extort from any person, firm, association, or corporation, any money or other thing of value, transmits in interstate or foreign commerce any communication containing any threat to kidnap any person or any threat to injure the person of another, shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than twenty years, or both.
(c) Whoever transmits in interstate or foreign commerce any communication containing any threat to kidnap any person or any threat to injure the person of another, shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than five years, or both.
(d) Whoever, with intent to extort from any person, firm, association, or corporation, any money or other thing of value, transmits in interstate or foreign commerce any communication containing any threat to injure the property or reputation of the addressee or of another or the reputation of a deceased person or any threat to accuse the addressee or any other person of a crime, shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than two years, or both.
18 USC 879. Threats against former Presidents and certain other persons
(a) Whoever knowingly and willfully threatens to kill, kidnap, or inflict bodily harm upon-
(1) a former President or a member of the immediate family of a former President;
(2) a member of the immediate family of the President, the President-elect, the Vice President, or the Vice President-elect;
(3) a major candidate for the office of President or Vice President, or a member of the immediate family of such candidate; or
(4) a person protected by the Secret Service under section 3056(a)(6);
shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than 5 years, or both.
are not the only threat statutes but rather are provided merely
for the purposes of example. As used in case cites herein "CA"
indicates "Court of Appeals," and "US" indicates
the Supreme Court Reporter volumes. As seen here - US (United States)
v. Lanier, 520 US (United States Reporter) 259, 269, 137 L.Ed.2d
(Lawyer's Edition Reporter) 432, 117 S.Ct. (Supreme Court Reporter)
1219 (1997) - you see the US Reporter, the Lawyer's Edition Reporter,
and the Supreme Court Reporter volumes all cited as reference guides
for finding where the case of United States v. Lanier can
To be guilty under these statutes one has to have uttered what is called a "true threat," which is a threat to commit an act of "unlawful violence" again an individual or group of individuals. (See US v. Bagdasarian, 652 F.3d 1113 (CA9 July 19, 2011) (citing Virginia v. Black, 538 US 343 (2003); see also US v. Twine, 853 F.2d 676 (CA9 1988); US v. Sutcliffe, 505 F.3d 944 (CA9 2007)). An example of such a threat might be:
"I will kill you . . . I am now armed[.]"
See Sutcliffe, id. at 951. But in Bagdasarian the nature of the threat was contextually third-person, not first-person:
Defendant Walter Bagdasarian said (about presidential candidate Obama) on a blog:
"Re: Obama fuck the niggar, he will have a 50 cal. in the head pretty soon."
"Shoot the nig, country fucked for another 4 years+ What nig has done ANYTHING right???? long term???? never in history, except sambos."
"Re: And so it begins."
"Pistol? Dude, Josh needs to get us one of these, just shoot the nigga's car and POOF!"
9th Circuit ruled:
"[I]t does not convey the notion that Bagdasarian himself had plans to fulfill the prediction[.]"
"Neither does the . . . statement reflect the defendant's intent to threaten that he himself would kill or injure Obama."
"The statement makes no reference to Bagdasarian himself and so [it] cannot reasonably be taken to express his intent to shoot Obama."
". . . fail to express an intent on his part to take any action. . ."
". . . is not sufficient to establish that he intended to threaten Obama himself."
"As we have explained, supra at 9808-13, that neither of Bagdasarian's statements on its face constitutes a true threat unprotected by the First Amendment. Most significantly, one is predictive and the other, exhortatory. For the same reasons, the evidence is not sufficient for any reasonable finder of fact to have concluded beyond a reasonable doubt that Bagdasarian intended his statements to be taken as threats. See Jackson, 443 US at 319."
"But, as we have explained, incitement [of others] to injure or kill a presidential candidate does not qualify as an offense under 18 USC § 879(a)(3)."
*End quotes of Bagdasarian decision.
The threatened conduct must constitute unlawful violence, and the threat must express a first-person intent on the part of the speaker to so act. Incitement of others to kill or injure a presidential candidate is not an offense. More importantly, for our purposes, the arrest of a felon is entirely legal; it is not unlawful violence.
"[P]utting certain individuals in harm's way by singling them out for the attentions of violent but unrelated third parties is [conduct] protected by the First Amendment."
See Sheehan v. Gregoire, 272 F.Supp.2d 1135, 1149-50 (US Dist. Court, Western District of WA at Seattle 2003) (citing Planned Parenthood, 290 F.3d 1063)). FindLaw on citizens arrest.
The authorities below suffice to prove the legality of the arrest of the person of a suspected felon without a warrant by a private person acting upon reasonable cause and suspicion. The right of citizen's arrest extends to any felony violation, state or federal, and is governed by state law. (See Brady v. US, 300 F. 540 (CA6 1924); US v. Coplon, 185 F.2d 629 (CA2 1950); Richardson v. US, 217 F.2d 696 (CA8 1954); Ward v. US, 316 F.2d 113 (CA9 1963); Elkanich v. US, 327 F.2d 417 (CA9 1964); US v. Swarovski, 557 F.2d 40 (CA2 1977); Dorsey v. US, 174 F.2d. 899 (CA5 1949)).
"The rule seems to be similar when as arrest is a so-called citizen's arrest, made by one not a law enforcement officer, it requires reasonable cause to believe the arrested party guilty of a felony before the arrest will support a search and seizure of evidence of crime. Information, belief, or suspicion as to commission of a felony, as jurisdiction for arrest by a private person without a warrant; 133 A.L.R. 608 (1941)."
State v. Jack, 63 Wn.2d 632, 388 P.2d 566 (1964); see also
State v. Darst, 65 Wn.2d 808, 811-12, 399 P.2d 618 (1965);
State v. Williams, 27 Wn.App. 848, 621 P.2d 176 (1980); State
v. Harp, 13 Wn.App. 239, 534 P.2d 842 (1975); State v. Clarke,
61 Wn.2d 138, 377 P.2d 449 (1962)).
In relation to citizen's arrest, a state may even derogate to extend the right to apply to the arrest of one who has committed a mere misdemeanor.
"In Arizona, statutes that are in derogation of the common law are strictly construed. See Foundation Dev. Corp. v. Loehmann's, 163 Ariz. 438, 444, 788 P.2d 1189, 1195 (1990). In the case of misdemeanors such as shoplifting, there is no common law privilege of arrest. Gortarez v. Smitty's Super Valu, Inc., 140 Ariz. 97, 102, 680 P.2d 807, 812 (1984). A.R.S. § 13-1805 is in derogation of the common law because it allows private individuals to detain persons suspected of shoplifting. Therefore, A.R.S. § 13-1805 must be strictly construed to only permit detention of "persons suspected" of shoplifting."
Shelburg v. City of Scottsdale, #CV-09-1800-PHX-NVW, USDC
Recent decisions relating to citizen's arrest include US v. Fullbright, 105 F.3d 443 (CA9 1995) in MT; US v. Grigg, 498 F.3d 1070 (CA9 2007) in OR; Tekle v. US, 457 F.3d 1088 (CA9 2005) in CA; Rhomberg v. Wilson, 108 F.3d 339 (CA9 1996) in CA; Collins v. Womancare, 878 F.2d 1145 (CA9 1989); Hopkins v. Bonvicino, 573 F.3d 752 (CA9 2008).
SPECIFIC QUOTES from US Dist. Courts and Circuit Courts:
UNPUBLISHED: Budnick v. Barnstable County Bar Advocates, Inc., #92-1933 (CA1 1993): "But, "a police officer, while unable to act as an officer in an adjoining jurisdiction, does not cease to be a citizen in that jurisdiction . . . and may lawfully conduct a citizen's arrest there if he has probable cause to believe that a felony has been committed and that the person arrested has committed it." Commonwealth v. Dise, 31 Mass. App.Ct. 701, 704, 583 N.E.2d 271 (1991), further appellate review denied, 412 Mass. 1102, 588 N.E.2d 691 (1992)."
USDC 1st Cir.:
Aldrich v. Town of Milton, Civil #2009-11282-JLT (USDC of Mass. July 9, 2012): "In the Commonwealth, "a private citizen may lawfully arrest someone who has in fact committed a felony." Grise, 398 Mass. at 250, 496 N.E.2d at 164; Harris, 11 Mass.App.Ct. at 170, 415 N.E.2d at 220."
Holm v. Town of Derry, Civil #11-cv-32-JD (USDC New Hampshire on 1st Cir., Dec. 20, 2011): "In support, Sienkiewicz cites RSA 627:5, IV, which states that a "private person acting on his own is justified in using non-deadly force upon another when and to the extent that he reasonably believes it necessary to arrest or prevent the escape from custody of such other whom he reasonably believes to have committed a felony and who in fact has committed that felony."
US v. Gowen, 40 F.2d 593, 596 (1930): "This [NY Code Crmnl. Proc. § 183] in effect is declaratory of the common law, which concededly permits a peace officer or a private individual to arrest without a warrant where a felony has in fact been committed by the person arrested and the person making the arrest had probable cause for so believing. See Carroll v. United States, 267 US 132, 161, 45 S.Ct. 280, 69 L.Ed. 543, 39 A.L.R. 790; Brady v. United States, 300 F. 540 (CA 6); Bishop, New, Crim. Proc. (2d Ed.) § 181." (See also US v. Lindenfield, 142 F.2d 829, 831 (CA2 1944) (citing Gowen, id.)).
US v. Swarovski, 557 F.2d 40, 45 (CA2 1977) (quoting Marsh v. US, 29 F.2d 172 (CA2 1928) judge L. Hand, quoting US v. Rosse, 418 F.2d 38, 39 (CA2 1969) cert. den. 397 US 998, 25 L.Ed.2d 408, 90 S.Ct. 1143 (1970): "Initially, there can be no doubt that defendant was lawfully arrested, even though the agents possessed no warrants. The law is clear that any person, law enforcement officer or private citizen, can make an arrest where a felony has in fact been committed, and the person making the arrest has probable cause for so believing. US v. Gowen, 2nd Cir., 40 F.2d 593, rev. on other grounds in Go-Bart Importing Co. v. US, 282 US 344, 51 S.Ct. 153, 75 L.Ed. 374; Carroll v. US, 267 US 132, 45 S.Ct. 280, 69 L.Ed. 543, 39 A.L.R. 790; Brady v. US, 6th Cir., 300 F. 540, cert. den. 266 US 620, 45 S.Ct. 99, 69 L.Ed. 472; Pritchett v. Sullivan, 8th Cir. 182 F. 480; cf. also 5 USCA § 300a, codifying the common law with regard to arrests by agents of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and A.L.I. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1930, § 21, and commentary, pp. 231-238. And the agents here certainly had more than probable cause for believing that defendant had just committed a felony...142 F.2d 829, at 831-2. (footnote omitted.) (This case concerned an arrest and prosecution for illicit sales of morphine, but took place long before the enactment of 26 USC § 7607 on July 18, 1956.)."
Dorsey v. United States, 174 F.2d 899 (CA5 1949): "As to Dorsey, we have concluded his arrest though without a warrant, and by persons who were not arresting officers, was lawful. There being no federal statute on the subject, the arrest in Florida for a federal offense is governed by Florida law. United States v. DiRe, 332 US 581, 68 S.Ct. 222, 92 L.Ed. 210. The Florida law is the common law, as modified by statute. The common law authorizes a private person also to arrest for a felony committed in his presence; or if a felony has been committed, and he has probable cause to believe and does believe the arrested person to be guilty. He can justify his not getting a warrant, though he had the opportunity, by proving that arrested person was actually guilty. 4 Am.Jur., Arrest, 35, 36, 37; C.J.S., Arrest sec. 8. See also US v. Gowen, 40 F.2d 593 (CA2), and Brady v. US, 300 F. 540, 541 (CA6)."
Brady v. United States, 300 F. 540, 543 (1924): "It is well established that the right of arrest without a warrant by a private person, in the absence of restrictive statutes, goes at least this far: That if a felony has in fact been committed, he may so arrest the one who is comitting it in his presence, or whom he has reasonable ground to suspect of having committed it. . . In the circumstance of this case, as hereinabove set forth, a private person would have been justified in arresting the defendants, without a warrant and in taking from them evidences of their crime, either on the ground that a felony had been committed[.]"
Richardson v. US, 217 F..2d 696, 698 (CA8 1954): "Complaint is made about the March 16th arrest by the narcotics agents. The arrest was made in Missouri, and under Missouri law a private person may make an arrest on showing of actual commission of a felony and reasonable grounds to suspect the accused."
USDC 8th Cir.:
Hester v. Redwood County, Civil #11-1690-ADM-JJK (USDC Minn. Aug. 6, 2012): "Under Minnesota law, a citizen's arrest may be made when (1) a misdemeanor or felony has been committed in the arresting person's presence, (2) the person arrested has committed the felony, even if not in the arresting person's presence, or (3) if a felony has in fact been committed and the arresting person has reasonable cause to believe the person arrested committed it. Minn.Stat. § 629.37."
US v. Kriz, 301 F.Supp. 1329 1331 (USDC Minnesota, Division III (July 25, 1969)): "Absent a federal statute, the validity of the arrest of defendant is to be resolved by state law subject to federal constitutional safeguards. (cites omitted). Minn. State § 629.37(3) authorizes an arrest without a warrant by a private person 'when a felony has in fact been committed, and he has reasonable cause for believing the person arrested to have committed it.' "
Foss v. US, 266 F. 881, 882 (1920): "It is the duty and the right, not only of every peace officer of the United States, but of every citizen, to assist in prosecuting, and in securing the punishment of, a breach of the peace of the United States. It is the right, as well as the duty of every citizen, when called upon by the proper officer to act as part of the posse comitatus in upholding the laws of the country."
"In Motes v. United States, 178 US 458, 20 S.Ct. 993, 44 L.Ed. 1150, the statute was held applicable to a conspiracy to injure, oppress, threaten, and intimidate one who had informed the collector of internal revenue of the carrying on of the distillery business in violation of the law. Said the court: "It was the right and privilege of Thompson, in return for the protection he enjoyed under the Constitution and laws of the United States, to aid in the execution of the laws of his country by giving information to the proper authorities of violations of those laws. The right and privilege may properly be said to be secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States." "
Ward v. US, 316 F.2d 113, (1963): "The postal inspectors are not 'peace officers,' as that term is defined by §§ 7 and 817 of the California Penal Code. But this is of no consequence, for the same right exists in private citizens to make arrests without a warrant, as in peace officers, provided subsection (3) (or some other subsection) of California Penal Code § 837 is satisfied. Subsection (3) has two requirements: (a) a felony must have been committed by someone; and (b) 'reasonable cause must exist' to believe the person arrested committed the felony."
"Any fair reading of the evidence hereinbefore set forth convinces us that reasonable cause for the arrest of appellant existed. 'Reasonable cause to arrest' is no esoteric formula. Would the information and knowledge the arresting person had lead a person of ordinary reasonable judgment, intelligence, care and prudence, to believe the person to be arrested had committed the felony? Mackie v. Ambassador Hotel & Inv. Corp., 1932, 123 Cal.App. 215, 11 P.2d 3; People v. Boss, 1930, 210 Ca1. 245, 290 P. 881."
"The belief may amount only to an honest and strong suspicion that the person arrested is guilty of a felony. Taylor v. Fine, D.C., 1953, 115 F.Supp. 68; United States v. Bell, D.C., 1943, 48 F.Supp. 986."
"Mere suspicion alone is not enough. Casserly v. Wheeler, 9 Cir. 1922, 282 F. 389; Poldo v. United States, 9 Cir. 1932, 55 F.2d 866; Cook v. Singer Sewing Machine Co., 1934, 138 Cal.App. 418, 32 P.2d 430."
"'Probable cause is a suspicion founded upon circumstances sufficiently strong to warrant a reasonable man in belief that charge is true.' People v. Brite, 9 Cal.2d 666, 72 P.2d 122. We agree with the trial judge that reasonable cause was established by substantial evidence sufficient to authorize appellant's arrest without a warrant."
Jack v. Rhay, 366 F.2d 191 (CA9 1966): "Under all of the facts it is established to my satisfaction that the arrest was lawful and the search incident to it. This made the evidence admissible. Reasonable cause to believe that felony has been committed and the arrested person committed it are sufficient to legalize the arrest even if made by private citizens. (See Fernandez v. Klinger, 346 F.2d 210, 211-12 (CA9 1965); Elkanich v. US, 327 F.2d 417 (CA9 1964), cert. den. 377 US 917; Ward v. US, 316 F.2d 113 (CA9 1963), cert. den. 375 US 862; Richardson v. US, 217 F.2d 696 (CA8 1964); US v. Coplon, 185 F.2d 629, 634, 28 A.L.R.2d 1041 (CA2 1950), cert. den. 342 US 920; Dorsey v. US, 174 F.2d 899 (CA6 1949), cert. den. 388 US 950 and 340 US 878; State v. McClung, 66 Wash.2d 654, 404 P.2d 460 (1965)."
Elkanich v. US, 327 F.2d 417, 420 (1964): "Speaking of probable cause sufficient to justify an arrest without a warrant, the Supreme Court, in Draper v. US, [358 US 307, 310, 314, 79 S.Ct. 329, 3 L.Ed.2d 327] supra, stated at page 313 of 358 US Reports, at page 333 of 79 S.Ct., 3 L.Ed.2d 327:
"In dealing with probable cause, ***as the very name implies, we deal with probabilities. There are not technical; they are the factual and practical considerations of every day life on which reasonable and prudent men, not legal technicians, act.' Brinegar v. United States, supra, 338 US 175 (69 S.Ct. at page 1310, 93 L.Ed. 1879). Probable cause exists where 'the facts and circumstances within (the arresting officer's) knowledge and of which they had reasonably trustworthy information (are) sufficient in themselves to warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief that' an offense has been or is being committed: Carroll v. US, 267 US 132, 162 (45 S.Ct. 280, 69 L.Ed. 543.' "
USDC 9th Cir.:
Smock v. Peppermill Casinos, Inc., #3:11-cv-00094-RCJ-VPC USDC Nevada (May 14, 2012): "Defendant notes that its employees, like any citizen, have the statutory privilege to arrest another citizen for a public offense committed or attempted in their presence. See Nev.Rev. Stat. § 171.126(1). (Fn.4)."
Fn.4: "If the offense is a felony, a private person may arrest the offender even though the offense was not committed in his presence, so long as he has "reasonable cause." See id. § 171.126(2)-(3). Defendants only allege misdemeanor trespassing here."
"Still, the guards were only entitled to use reasonable force. See State v. Weddell, 118 Nev. 206, 43 P.3d 987, 988 (Nev. 2002) ("[A] private person, when arresting another person pursuant to NRS § 171.126, may use no more force than is necessary and reasonable to secure the arrest.")."
Huang v. McEwen, Civil #09-0355-PA-JCG (USDC Central Dist. of Cal. April 26, 2012): "In California, the defense of citizen's arrest mandates in pertinent part that a private person may arrest another for a public offense committed or attempted in his presence. See Cal. Penal Code § 837. "An arrest is taking a person into custody, in a case and in the manner authorized by law. An arrest may be made by a peace officer or by a private person." Id. § 834."
USDC 10th Cir.:
Stroh v. US, Civil #11-cv-00344-LTB-BNB (USDC Colorado, Sept. 17, 2012): "However, I do find a private analogue is available, under Colorado law, to a private individual making a citizen's arrest.' Colorado Revised Statutes § 16-3-201 allows a person who is not a peace officer to arrest another person when any crime has been or is being committed by the arrested person in the presence of the person making the arrest. See also Colo.Rev.Stat. § 18-1-707(7) (providing that "[a] private person acting on his own account is justified in using reasonable and appropriate physical force upon another person when and to the extent that he reasonably believes it necessary to effect the arrest, or to prevent the escape from custody of an arrested person who has committed an offense in his presence")."
US v. Lima, 424 A.2d 113, 120 (1980): "Congress' intent by enacting this statute was to define and restrict the private citizen's common law right to arrest. [S]ection 23-528(b) limits the scope of citizen's arrest power to both felonies and specific misdemeanors, committed in the presence of the private person as distinguished from those not committed in his presence." (cites to Congressional Hearings omitted). By so limiting the citizen's power of arrest, Congress recognized that "law enforcement should generally be carried out by professionals." H.R. REP. No.907, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 118 (1969-70); 1970 D.C. Legislative and Administrative Service 511. See also US v. Dorsey, 146 US. App.D.C. 28, 30 n.4, 449 F.2d 1104, 1106 n.4 (1971). A citizen's arrest power presumes that a law-abiding citizen for his own personal purposes may desire to stop criminal activity just as a merchant has a personal interest in deterring theft of his goods. Consequently, Congress has recognized these legitimate private interests of apprehending persons committing certain crimes within their presence."
*End federal citizen's arrest cites.
This collection of relevant decisions, from appellate and district courts across the country, make clear and firmly establishes that the right to arrest a felon at large is entirely legal for anyone who has reasonable suspicion that the person to be arrested is indeed guilty of having committed the crime. A great state case about citizen's arrest is State v. Sobrino, 587 So.2d 1347 3rd District Court of Appeals of Florida (July 11, 1991). The Supreme Court has held that:
"[W]e have referred to the Court of Appeals when enquiring whether a right was "clearly established." "
US v. Lanier, 520 US 259, 269, 137 L.Ed.2d 432, 117 S.Ct.
1219 (1997) (citing Mitchell v. Forsyth, 427 US 511, 533,
86 L.Ed.2d 411, 105 S.Ct. 2806 (1985); Davis v. Scherer,
468 US 183, 191-92, 82 L.Ed.2d. 139, 104 S.Ct. 3012 (1984); Elder
v. Halloway, 510 US 510, 516, 127 L.Ed.2d 344, 114 S.Ct. 1019
(1994) (treating Court of Appeals decisions as "relevant authority"
that must be considered as part of qualified immunity enquiry)).
It is also clear that the individual's right to arrest a felon at large is independent of the opinion and discretion of governmental authorities, that it doesn't require the intervention of the courts, that no prior approval on the part of law enforcement authorities need be sought in advance of making such an arrest. Nowhere was there any mention of an exclusion of any particular felon or felony violation from this clearly established right. If the police, the IRS, or a prosecutor, can reasonably be deemed to have committed one or more felony violations of state or federal law, there's nothing in these authorities that seeks to exempt them from being arrested by any individual as a matter of right.
We also saw no limitation on the number of individuals who would have the right to arrest a felon at large. If a felony has been committed, and if 300+ million Americans thereafter become reasonably convinced of the fact, there's nothing to prevent each and all of them from entering the home of the felon, arresting them, and delivering them to authorities competent to receive them into custody.
Reasonable suspicion that a felony has been committed translates into or equates to the right to arrest the felon with any necessary force. (See Shelburg v. City of Scottsdale, #CV-09-1800-PHX-NVW, USDC Arizona (8/23/2010); US v. Fullbright, 105 F.3d 443 (CA9 1995) in MT; US v. Grigg, 498 F.3d 1070 (CA9 2007) in OR; Tekle v. US, 457 F.3d 1088 (CA9 2005) in CA; Rhomberg v. Wilson, 108 F.3d 339 (CA9 1996) in CA; Collins v. Womancare, 878 F.2d 1145 (CA9 1989); Hopkins v. Bonvicino, 573 F.3d 752 (CA9 2008); Budnick v. Barnstable County Bar Advocates, Inc., #92-1933 (CAl 1993); Aldrich v. Town of Milton, Civil #2009-11282-JLT (USDC of Mass. July 9, 2012); Holm v. Town of Derry, Civil #11-cv-32-JD (USDC New Hampshire,Dec. 20, 2011); US v. Gowen, 40 F.2d 593, 596 (1930); Carroll v. United States, 267 US 132, 161, 45 S.Ct. 280, 69 L.Ed. 543, 39 A.L.R. 790; US v. Lindenfield, 142 F.2d 829, 831 (CA2 1944); US v. Swarovski, 557 F.2d 40, 45 (CA2 1977); Carroll v. US, 267 US 132, 45 S.Ct. 280, 69 L.Ed. 543, 39 A.L.R. 790; Brady v. US, 300 F. 540 (CA6 1924), cert. den. 266 US 620, 45 S.Ct. 99, 69 L.Ed. 472; Richardson v. US, 217 F.2d 696, 698 (CA8 1954); Hester v. Redwood County, Civil #11-1690-ADM-JJK (USDC Minn. Aug. 6, 2012); US v. Kriz, 301 F.Supp. 1329 1331 (USDC Minnesota, Division III (July 25, 1969); Foss v. US, 266 F. 881, 882 (1920); Ward v. US, 316 F.2d 113, (1963); Jack v. Rhay, 366 F.2d 191 (CA9 1966); Fernandez v. Klinger, 346 F.2d 210, 211-12 (CA9 1965); Elkanich v. US, 327 F.2d 417 (CA9 1964), cert. den. 377 US 917; US v. Coplon, 185 F.2d 629, 634, 28 A.L.R.2d 1041 (CA2 1950), cert. den. 342 US 920; Dorsey v. US, 174 F.2d 899 (CA6 1949), cert. den. 388 US 950 and 340 US 878; State v. McClung, 66 Wash.2d 654, 404 P.2d 460 (1965); Smock v. Peppermill Casinos, Inc., #3:11-cv-00094-RCJ-VPC USDC Nevada (May 14, 2012); Huang v. McEwen, Civil #09-0355-PA-JCG (USDC Central Dist. of Cal. April 26, 2012); Stroh v. US, Civil #11-cv-00344-LTB-BNB (USDC Colorado, Sept. 17, 2012); US v. Lima, 424 A.2d 113, 120 (1980)). Have you seen any felons lately?